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Metascience: For a Scientific
General Discourse
François Maurice1
RÉSUMÉ — L’humain produit des discours sur le monde : mythologies,
religions, mysticismes, philosophies, science. La majorité de ses dis-
cours sont de nature transcendante. À la suite d’une clarification
conceptuelle fondée sur les notions de réflexion et de discours gé-
néral, la philosophie apparaît comme un discours général transcend-
ant parmi d’autres ; d’où l’échec de celle-ci à rendre compte du
monde et de la science ; d’où la nécessité de disposer d’un discours
général non transcendant, un discours général proprement scien-
tifique, une métascience. À la lumière des frontières ainsi redéfinies, il
sera proposé de fonder la métascience sur une interprétation de
l’œuvre de Mario Bunge. Cette interprétation se fonde sur un ensem-
ble de postulats généraux auxquels Mario Bunge adhère et tenus
pour acquis par les scientifiques. Il est proposé que soutenir un tel en-
semble de postulats sans les problématiser à la manière des philoso-
phes, fait en sorte que la pensée de Bunge ne relève plus de la phi-
losophie.
ABSTRACT — Human produce discourses on the world: mythologies, re-
ligions, mysticisms, philosophies, science. The majority of those dis-
courses are transcendent in nature. Following a conceptual clarifica-
tion based on the notions of reflection and general discourse,
philosophy appears as a transcendent general discourse among oth-
ers; hence the failure of the latter to account for the world and sci-
ence; hence the need for a non-transcendent general discourse, a
properly scientific general discourse, a metascience. In light of these
1 Graduated in social statistics, mathematics and philosophy, independent researcher, founder of
the Society for the Progress of Metasciences and translator of the Philosophical Dictionary by
Mario Bunge published by Éditions Matériologiques.
François Maurice | Metascience. For a Scientific General Discourse ï2
Mεtascience | No.1 | Mario Bunge: Thinker of Materiality
redefined boundaries, it will be proposed to base metascience on an
interpretation of Mario Bunge’s work. This interpretation is based on a
set of general postulates that Mario Bunge adheres to and taken for
granted by scientists. It is proposed that supporting such a set of pos-
tulates without problematizing them in the manner of the philoso-
phers, makes Bunge’s thinking no longer philosophical.
[The philosopher’s] imagination should be
impregnated with the scientific outlook and […]
he should feel that science has presented us with
a new world, new concepts and new methods, not
known in earlier times, but proved by experience
to be fruitful where the older concepts and
methods proved barren.
BERTRAND RUSSELL
My philosophical development
The idea behind the [Bungean] program is as
commonsense as could be. This may sound
disappointing, as it lacks all extravagance, but
then this is what the program is all about. The
idea is to stay well within one world […].
JOSEPH AGASSI
Ontology and its discontent
Only philosophers and inmates in a lunatic
asylum think that someone can create reality
rather than just alter it.
MARIO BUNGE
Chasing reality
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The human need to explain the world is profound. In general, the expla-
nations put forward by science do not satisfy this need. So we’re looking
for a different kind of explanation. Often the difference between a scien-
tific explanation and a more satisfactory explanation is often translated
by the idea that one seeks the why of things and not the how. To explain
is to seek meaning in existence and therefore meaning in our lives. Hu-
mans need a general discourse about the world.
To meet this need, proposed explanations have taken several forms.
Several general discourses on the world have been proposed. These gen-
eral discourses on the world are, for example, animism, myths and reli-
gion. One thing in common with these discourses is the place reserved for
one form or another of transcendence, to something more beyond mere
material existence, something that cannot be grasped by the natural fac-
ulties of the human being. Intuition, reason, reflection, creativity, will,
feeling, perception, etc. The apprehension of this transcendent reality can
then be done through the intermediary of unnatural faculties: Intuition,
Reason, Reflection, Creativity, Will, Sensation, Perception, etc. Often, a
general transcendent discourse is integral or total. In this case, such a
discourse maintains a cosmology which explains the place of the human
in the world, an ideology which explains the place of the individual in so-
ciety, and a gnoseology, what the human is entitled to know, but especially
what he is forbidden to know.
It is common to identify philosophy and general discourse, that is to
say to affirm that philosophy is the general discourse par excellence; there
would be general reflection only philosophical. We will show that philoso-
phy is a type of general discourse invented by humans in the same way as
other general discourses. And if it is one type of general discourse among
others, then we can question its relevance in the same way that we ques-
tion the relevance of animism, myths and religions.
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To do this, we will have to focus on the notions of worldview, reflection,
pre-methodic reflection, trans-empirical reflection, general postulate, and
method. A fair appreciation of these concepts makes us understand that
in the methodological order, the adoption of general assumptions precedes
the development and use of an approach or method. Thus, the adoption of
a number of assumptions only requires our natural ability to think. It is
neither a scientific method, nor a religious method, nor a philosophical
method, nor a metascientific method that dictates to us the assumptions
on which our thinking will be based. If our argument has value, then we
can propose a general scientific discourse based on a number of postulates
obtained by a pre-methodic reflection. Therefore, we can disprove the
widely held idea to justify the use of philosophy: scientists philosophy in
spite of themselves.
This text offers a research program inspired by the work of Mario
Bunge and in the spirit of the Enlightenment. In fact, it is more than a
research program because we propose to establish a new discipline, or ra-
ther a new field of science. This scientific field, metascience, can be de-
scribed as a scientific general discourse. Our redrawing of disciplinary
boundaries is based on the observation that general reflection is not to be
confused with philosophical reflection. As we will try to show, philosophy
does not have a monopoly on general thinking.
Our task is both easy and arduous. It is easy because we have an ex-
ample of an accomplished metascientist, Mario Bunge. It is enough to use
his work as often as necessary to support our point, while bearing in mind
that it is a starting point for any metascientific research. We will therefore
characterize metascience in the second part entitled “Scientific General
Discourse.” But before we even characterize metascience, we must demon-
strate that philosophy is a general discourse among others, and, even
more difficult, convince non-transcendent thinkers that they do not prac-
tice philosophy. This is the objective of the first part, “General Discourses.”
1 GENERAL DISCOURSES
1.1 REFLECTION, METHOD, AND GENERAL DISCOURSE
Traditionally, philosophers have argued, including Bunge, that science
is based on philosophical principles or assumptions and that it can’t do
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without philosophy. We support the idea that these general postulates are
not of a philosophical nature. If they are not philosophical, what is their
nature then? To answer this question, we must distinguish worldview, re-
flection, method and general discourse. A vision of the world, or Weltan-
schauung, is a set of inarticulate beliefs as to the nature of reality. A vision
of the world does not seek or desire coherence, which implies that philos-
ophy cannot be confused with a vision of the world (Vuillemin 1986, p. viii)
because “any philosophy worthy of the name, not being simply a bag full
of bits and pieces but an articulate cluster of parts, becomes intelligible
only through the relation of its different philosophical themes to a highest
principle” (ibid., p. 128-29). Reflection is a natural faculty in humans.
Thinking and reasoning are acts that humans spontaneously perform
(which does not mean that there is no effort to be made). Thus, for Des-
cartes, “common sense is the most shared thing in the world.” However,
“it is not enough to have a good mind, but the main thing is to apply it
well.” We therefore need a method which makes it possible to “conduct
one’s reason well and seek the truth in the sciences.” Descartes is, of
course, neither the first nor the last philosopher to develop a philosophical
method in order to reflect well and thus produce a general discourse. But,
thinking about objects, using a method to guide this thinking, to finally
reach or produce knowledge, requires from the outset to adopt certain gen-
eral postulates as to the nature of the world and the objects that compose
it, as well as to the nature of thought, and therefore the link between the
world and our thought. However, this reflection is pre-methodical. What
do we mean by pre-methodical thinking?
There is no method to convince ourselves or reinforce our belief that
the world is of a certain nature. We think, we weigh the pros and cons, we
put forward some examples, but in the end we decide according to a par-
ticular worldview. As far as Bunge is concerned, the success of science is
convincing enough to adopt, and not to problematize, the general assump-
tions of science. But these general assumptions of science have not been
demonstrated, any more than those of philosophical or religious doctrines
cannot be demonstrated. The demonstrations come only after a set of gen-
eral assumptions has been adopted. These assumptions then constitute a
set of premises, most often implicit, to any demonstration that is within a
given frame of thought. Let’s take one example. Let’s think about the im-
portant phenomenon of perception. What causes perception? Is it caused
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at all or is it an autonomous phenomenon? If it is provoked, is it caused by
material, immaterial, spiritual objects, etc.?
The answer to these questions does not depend on a method, but on a
pre-methodical reflection. Thus, the Cartesian method only makes sense
within the framework of a certain set of general postulates, postulates to
which Descartes arrives after a pre-methodical reflection. This applies to
any method whether philosophical, religious, mystical or scientific. Thus,
Perrin’s demonstration of the existence of the atom is only valid if one
adopts the general assumptions of science. But these general assumptions
are not obtained by the scientific method; they are pre-methodical. To ar-
gue that it is material objects interacting with us that provoke perception
is not demonstrated by the scientific method. Another example, again
linked to the question of perception, is that of the dichotomy between pri-
mary and secondary qualities. It is through a pre-methodical reflection
that we convince ourselves that objects possess properties that are not
those that are spontaneously attributed to them. In this way, we could
continue our pre-methodical thinking and thus develop a set of general
postulates specific to science. We’ll come back to that in the second part.
For now, we want to return to the question of the nature of these general
assumptions.
Since these general assumptions are obtained by pre-methodical reflec-
tion, they cannot be considered as philosophical postulates. Philosophical
schools themselves need to think about the general assumptions they will
adopt. Only then can they construct a method for philosophizing and de-
veloping a general philosophical discourse. Thinking is not a method, it is
a faculty, and thinking about general assumptions in a particular frame
of thought requires neither a method nor even extensive training in any
field, be it philosophical, religious, mystical or scientific. Of course, the
above is a posteriori reconstruction of what is actually happening. In fact,
there is a back-and-forth between pre-methodical reflections, method and
the general discourse that is being developed. It was important for us to
highlight the non-philosophical nature of the general assumptions of sci-
ence.
We thus note that there are several general discourses about the world
and about human nature: philosophical, religious, mystical, etc. Oddly
enough, science does not have its own general discourse. We will come
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back to this in the second part since for the moment we want to underline
the transcendent nature that many of these discourses have taken. What
do we mean by transcendent? In his Vocabulaire technique et critique de
la philosophie, one of the meanings attributed by Lalande to transcendent
is “what does not result from the natural play of a certain class of beings
or actions, but which implies the intervention of a principle outside and
superior to it.” In addition, in his Dictionnaire de la langue philosophique,
one of the meanings attributed by Foulquié to transcendent is that “which
is beyond or outside the domain considered and is not of the same nature
as this domain.” The two meanings are not mutually exclusive and in fact
complement each other. In a frame of thought which postulates only the
existence of material objects, we can advance that any general discourse
which postulates the existence of objects of a nature different from con-
crete or material objects, which implies appealing to principles external to
these objects, is a discourse transcendent in relation to this frame of
thought. It is within this frame of thought that science and its method are
developed, and it is within this framework that a general scientific dis-
course, a metascience, is developed, of which Bunge laid the foundations.
Again, it is neither philosophy, nor science, nor metascience that dictates
the basic postulates of any thought because there is no philosophical,
metascientific or scientific method that comes into play here. Methodolog-
ically, you must think and then convince yourself to adopt some elemen-
tary postulates before even undertaking a philosophical, scientific or
metascientific research.
Mythical, religious and mystical discourses are therefore transcendent
discourses in relation to a general scientific discourse. The case of philos-
ophy is more complicated because there are transcendent doctrines and
immanent doctrines. We believe, however, that the majority of philosoph-
ical doctrines are transcendent. The idealist doctrines are obviously so.
The empiricist doctrines seem more down to earth, but it turns out that
they are transcendent when we examine them from the perspective of a
general postulate, the dichotomy between the factual and the formal, ad-
vanced by several philosophers, taken for granted by Bunge and, it seems,
by the majority of scientists. This dichotomy is a special case of a more
general dichotomy between the world and our representation of the world,
or between the real and the fictional.
François Maurice | Metascience. For a Scientific General Discourse ï8
Mεtascience | No.1 | Mario Bunge: Thinker of Materiality
At the root of empiricism is the idea that we do not have “direct” access
to the world beyond perception, or, to put it another way, there are no
logical or necessary links between our perceptions and the objects that
would produce them. Here, it must be understood that the formal takes
precedence over the factual. It is true that such logical links do not exist,
but if they do not exist it is because the objects in question are not formal
objects. This is where empiricist transcendence comes to light. We then
call upon principles external to concrete objects and we grant logic an on-
tological, epistemological and methodological status. Logic then becomes
a philosophical logic and no longer just a formal logic. This philosophical
logic would be able to tell us what exists or not, what is knowable or not
and, if so, how to acquire knowledge. If we are thinkers who take for
granted the general postulates of science, notably the existence of the con-
crete world and the dichotomy between the factual and the formal, then
logic is not an ontology, epistemology or methodology. Now, if we don’t
have direct access to trans-empirical objects, especially those studied by
science, how do we form concepts about them? Bunge provides us with the
answer: “The transempirical concepts do not originate in perception, i.e.
they cannot be learned from experience but must be acquired by reflection”
(Bunge 1983b, p. 161, our italics).
We therefore propose a preliminary breakdown of general discourses;
the study of general discourses is a research project in itself, especially the
psychological and sociological aspects. The importance of redefining the
boundaries we are proposing is that any general discourse that is not
clearly mythical, religious or mystical is attributed to philosophy. But
since philosophy is largely dominated by transcendent philosophies, and
even, we believe, that philosophy is inherently transcendent, then any
general discourse runs the risk of being contaminated by transcendent
considerations.
To associate immanent discourses with philosophy is a consequence of
the weight of tradition. Not knowing what these immanent discourses are,
we place them among the philosophical doctrines. But, from our point of
view, the writings of the same immanent thinker, according to the object
of each writing, can be associated either with a discourse on arts and let-
ters, or with a discourse of connivance or the living-together, or with a
general scientific discourse or metascience. This is what Figure 1 at-
tempts to show by the dashes around the category of immanent
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philosophies. From our point of view, this category should disappear in
favor of the other three categories of general discourse. And these three
discourses are autonomous even if they can influence each other. They are
autonomous in the sense that there is no strong or necessary, philosophi-
cal, scientific, metascientific, logical, religious, or other link that connects
them. This autonomy of immanent discourses is an additional reason for
not grouping them under a common denomination that is philosophy.
Figure 1: Preliminary representation of some general discourses
We were led to reflect on the nature of reflection, method and general
discourse, noting that Mario Bunge took for granted an impressive
amount of general postulates. Most thinkers may hold such a large num-
ber of postulates, but Bunge had made a habit of spreading them out into
the open. He also argues that these assumptions are the ones on which
science is based, which is defensible given the nature of these assump-
tions. What is most surprising, however, is not that a thinker puts forward
a few assumptions and argues that science conforms to them, since after
all this is what philosophers of science do, it was rather that this same
thinker adopts these postulates to construct his semantic, ontological,
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epistemological and methodological theories. Instead of questioning the
assumptions that can reasonably be attributed to science, Bunge relies on
them to develop his general thinking and theories about the world and
science. As Mahner notes: “Modern metaphysics involves more than just
a collection of general principles: it must present itself as a theory incor-
porating ontological concepts, consistent with the results of science” (Mah-
ner 2013, p. 44). Thus, Bunge does not problematize the general assump-
tions of science as one might expect from a philosopher.
If we distance ourselves from philosophy, what do we see? A general
discourse among others. The resemblance between Bunge’s thought and
philosophical doctrines is due to the fact that we are in the presence of
general discourses about the world and about knowledge of this world.
Other thoughts produce general discourses, such as religions, myths and
several mystical doctrines. At the foundation of each discourse is an atti-
tude and an approach. Bunge resolutely adopts a scientific attitude and
approach. It is for this reason that we can identify his thought with a sci-
entific general discourse. Since Bunge is interested in knowledge of the
world, and since nowadays a good part of this knowledge comes from sci-
ence, and, finally, since the success of science is obvious, he extracts and
adopts what he believes to be the most general assumptions of science.
Just as it is a starting point for science, it is a starting point for Bunge’s
thought.
So, contrary to what one might think, Bunge’s methodological starting
point is not science or common sense, but the most general transempirical
concepts at the foundation of science. These concepts are understood nei-
ther by perception alone nor by reason alone. In fact, these concepts can-
not be grasped, but must be constructed after reflection. It is a creative
act and not a simple apprehension of a perceptual or intellectual given.
Reflection and creation go hand in hand. Reflection is a faculty, while a
general discourse is a construction. Reflection allows Bunge to identify the
general postulates on which science rests. From these postulates, he elab-
orates his general discourse. Thus, Bunge does not seek to problematize
the starting point of the sciences, he seeks to identify it and to rely on it
in order to develop a scientific general discourse, a metascience.
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1.2 REFLECTION AND PHILOSOPHY
To think is to call upon an arsenal of cognitive processes to learn (ac-
quire new knowledge) or to find a solution to a problem (which is a form
of learning): compare, generalize, instantiate, memorize, remember, in-
vent, deduce, calculate, associate, preach, classify, predict, focus, pay at-
tention, analyze, synthesize, perceive, explore, form concepts and proposi-
tions, learn a skill, criticize, theorize, plan, speak, write, decide, choose,
etc. In short, thinking is a complex cerebral process (formerly we spoke of
operations of the mind) which involves a large amount of an individual’s
cognitive resources in order to produce, transform or use knowledge
(Bunge 1983b, p. 23).
Every human thinks. Reflection is natural and spontaneous. As soon
as we encounter a problem, and unless it immediately endangers our lives,
we have the choice to ignore it, hoping that it resolves itself, avoid it or
run away from it while taking it into account, or confront it directly in
order to solve it. In any case, we are thinking. It seems that there are
several degrees of reflection depending on the object or problem about
which we are thinking. Most of the time we think about practical issues,
whether in our private lives or in our public life. We also reflect on our
relationships, private or public, which can lead us to moral reflection.
However, reflection alone does not produce valid arguments or theories,
although it is necessary to think in order to argue and theorize. There is
no general method for thinking, let alone algorithms that would achieve
knowledge, because to think is to continually making assumptions over
and over, then thinking again about these assumptions and decisions. And
making assumptions and making decisions are creative acts, that is, we
create new assemblies of neurons or psychons (ibid., pp. 41–42, 2008,
p. 80). And while no algorithm can create material objects, the brain, a
material object par excellence, can create fictions, such as an algorithm,
by ideation and abstraction, which are material processes (Bunge 1974a,
p. 13, 1983b, p. 56).
Although it is true that the same person can think in the context of
several general discourses simultaneously or move from one discourse to
another without too much difficulty, it does not follow that if I think, I
necessarily practice a philosophy, unless I identify reflection and philoso-
phy, and then the very term philosophy loses all its meaning. Any
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reflection takes place within a framework whether this framework is
mythical, religious, philosophical or scientific.
Thus, reflection is not to be confused with philosophy. Philosophers
were not mistaken. They sought to develop methods to know reality, be-
cause reflection alone is not systematic enough and does not produce the-
ories. Plato developed dialectics, Aristotle syllogistic, Descartes wrote the
Discourse on the Method, Husserl proposed phenomenological reduction
and the Vienna Circle, logical analysis. General discourses cannot there-
fore be confused with philosophy because reflection is not unique to phi-
losophers and philosophers propose particular methods for obtaining
knowledge and producing theories.
Reflection requires no advanced philosophical, scientific or metascien-
tific training. It is enough, in general, to have some life experience and
elementary education to be able to reflect on the living-together and about
the world. Thinking about more advanced topics, on the other hand, re-
quires further learning on the part of a person. Again, reflection is not a
discourse or a system of thought or a theory; it is a brain process. And the
products of reflection do not form a discourse or a system of thought or a
theory. We will come back to that in the second part when we characterize
metascience.
In any case, the study of reflection is a matter of psychology. For our
purpose, it suffices to admit that there is a human faculty that allows us
to make hypotheses, that is to say propositions which are not the fruit of
a logical deduction, hypotheses which, concerning the world, often relate
to objects that lie beyond perception.
1.3 TRANSEMPIRICAL REFLECTION
Reflection is therefore not to be confused with philosophy. Reflection
can be practiced by all, in the sense that there is no need to be a scientist,
a metascientific or a philosopher to think of some general questions about
the living-together and the world. Let us take an example of reflection
which does not require special training. A transempirical reflection, a re-
flection about what lies beyond sensations and perception, is a thought
experiment that allows us to realize the difference between the properties
that belong to things, the primary qualities, and the sensations that our
interactions with things provoke in us, the secondary qualities. Thinking
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about the distinction between primary and secondary qualities is one of
the most important thought experiments an individual interested in
knowing the world can have. Such a reflection allows us to move away
from common sense, which attributes the secondary qualities or sensitive
qualities to the object that provokes them in us.
The primary qualities are properties that belong to objects. These are
properties that exist independently of sentient beings. Secondary qualities
are properties that are wrongly attributed to the objects with which we
interact when they are in fact sensations caused by these objects. This
reflection is in principle accessible to all, at least it does not require a thor-
ough knowledge of either science, metascience or philosophy. The conclu-
sion that any reasonable person will reach will be to admit the distinction.
Science and metascience take this distinction for granted, which is not
generally the case with transcendent philosophical doctrines. Philoso-
phers will tend to problematize the distinction because they seek a
“strong” link, philosophical, metaphysical, logical, linguistic, discursive,
that would unite perception with the perceived object.
Note that such a thought experiment, although it is within the reach of
the greatest number, is not obvious. Even if we can suppose that some
individuals among our distant ancestors practiced it and that they arrived
at the reasonable conclusion which we reached, it was still necessary to
wait a few millennia before thinkers clearly stated it, such as Democritus,
and it took two more millennia for psychosocial conditions to be met for
the distinction to become attractive to members of the emerging commu-
nity of early modern scholars, such as Descartes, Galileo, Locke and New-
ton. The distinction between primary qualities and secondary qualities
makes it possible to dissolve a philosophical problem described as funda-
mental by Bouveresse following Vuillemin:
If philosophy were to be characterized therefore by reference to a funda-
mental question, it would be that of the distinction between reality and
appearance. And since there are, for reasons that are not accidental but
intrinsic, several possible ways, fundamentally different and incompatible
between them, to draw the dividing line between reality and appearance,
it helps to understand why philosophy has always presented itself so far in
the form of an irreducible plurality of systems that history has never man-
aged to separate (Bouveresse 2012 p. 41).
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Each philosophical doctrine, at least among transcendent doctrines,
therefore attempts to determine the border between appearance and real-
ity. The distinction between appearance and reality bears witness to tran-
scendence in philosophy, while this distinction is rejected by Bunge and
by science: “In the philosophical tradition appearance is the opposite of
reality. This is mistaken, for an appearance is a process occurring in the
nervous system of some animal, hence it is just as much of a fact as an
external event. (Bunge 2020, p. 26).”Appearances” are facts of the world
just like all other facts of the “external world.”
There is therefore no opposition between appearance and reality; there
is only reality. The problem of distinguishing between reality and appear-
ance therefore becomes a false problem. The rejection of this distinction,
the refusal to see an opposition “between what is really and what appears
only to be” (Bouveresse 2012, p. 8; italics in the original), will result in
Bunge’s general discourse about the world, his ontology, which does not
try to establish what is, since there is only reality and this is studied by
the sciences. Bungean ontology is an abstract representation of the world
obtained by a study of scientific constructs and by an ordering of the gen-
eral postulates of science. Such an ontology does not concern objects which
would be more real than the concrete objects studied by the sciences.
Some will protest against the restrictive and dogmatic nature of meta-
science. The framework of thought that we will propose in the second part,
rather than hindering creativity, will stimulate it and direct it towards
avenues of research that were previously closed by the old philosophical
frameworks. You only have to look over the work of Mario Bunge, espe-
cially his Treatise on Basic Philosophy22, to convince yourself that the
work that awaits the metascientists is immense. To use another image,
the exploration of the forest is just beginning and Bunge opened a first
path (several paths in fact!). The problems to be solved will require a good
dose of creativity and any creativity requires its framework.
2 The Treatise on Basic Philosophy consists of 8 tomes in 9 volumes: Semantics I: Sense and Ref-
erence (1974a), Semantics II: Interpretation and Truth (1974b), Ontology I: The Furniture of the
World (1977a), Ontology II: A World of Systems (1979a), Epistemology I: Exploring the World
(1983b), Epistemology II: Understanding the World (1983c), Epistemology III, part 1: Formal and
Physical Sciences (1985a), Epistemology III, part 2: Life Science, Social Science and Technology
(1985b), Ethics: The Good and the Right (1989). In his memoirs, Entre deux mondes (2016, p. 323),
Bunge considers that his book Political Philosophy (2009b) constitutes the 10th and last volume
of the Treatise.
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1.4 PHILOSOPHICAL TRANSCENDENCE
Vuillemin explains the nature of philosophy by its simultaneous adop-
tion, from its origins, of the axiomatic method, newly invented, and of the
postulate of the appearance/reality dichotomy:
To sum up, philosophy results from the reorganization of the two dimen-
sions of mythical signs. The mythical story gives way to the quest for true
principles according to the standards of the axiomatic method. This was the
first, foundational relevance of axiomatics to philosophy. At the same time,
however, philosophy intends to reform and to restore mythical ontology
dismissed by axiomatics. A determinate ontology takes the place of the
equivocal reference to reality. The second connection of axiomatics with
philosophy is through demonstration. But the requirement of consistency,
which no material consideration comes to hinder in axiomatic method, has,
in philosophy, to cope with ontology. Between self-evident principles
equally recommended by common sense but mutually inconsistent, a
choice is imposed on philosophy which explains its divisions. Finally, philos-
ophy is like axiomatics in so far as both seek truth. But in contradistinction
to scientific truth, its consideration of ontology makes philosophy general-
ize an opposition which is only of local and minor importance in science.
Competing philosophical systems struggle for recognized, if not fixed, fron-
tiers between appearance and reality. (Vuillemin 1986, p. 114)
But since we can neither agree on a set of axioms nor on the line be-
tween appearance and reality, philosophy then split into a plurality of doc-
trines.
We believe that most philosophical doctrines are transcendent pre-
cisely because these doctrines are based on this division between appear-
ance and reality, and that the boundary they seek to draw calls upon prin-
ciples foreign to the concrete world. And this border will be established by
each doctrine using pre-methodical reflection. We do not yet philosophize
when we draw the line between appearance and reality; we put forward
our object of study and it is only then that we will philosophize by using
methods that we believe suitable for this object. Although the majority of
philosophers these days do not openly discuss Being, this god of philoso-
phers, they are always animated by his search and by the discovery of an
infallible faculty of knowing it.
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The faculty to achieve this can be Intuition, Reason, Reflection, Crea-
tivity, Will, Sensation, Perception, etc., which gives rise to different phi-
losophies, for example rationalism, intuitionism, empiricism, etc., but in
all cases these faculties have nothing to do with intuition, reason, reflec-
tion, creativity, will, sensation, perception, etc., with which we are all en-
dowed naturally. We must therefore pay attention to the use that philos-
ophers make of these terms. Even if a philosopher does not write the word
with a capital letter, it is a supernatural faculty that he has in mind and
not a natural faculty. We note, however, that most philosophers wander
from a natural conception to a supernatural conception of these faculties,
without always realizing it, that is to say in good faith, which is worse
than a philosopher who would assume the transcendent nature of his
thought and would develop a coherent discourse, for want of being reason-
able and rational.
It is quite common to associate philosophy with rational discourse,
which makes our characterization of philosophy as a transcendent general
discourse seems even stranger. The form of philosophical transcendence
is special. This transcendence seems to be unique to the West, which in-
herited it from ancient Greece. It is a discursive, rationalizing, logicizing,
linguistic, axiomatizing transcendence. Of course, transcendent philo-
sophical discourses are based on discussion and debate, which is far from
the case with other forms of transcendent discourses. Even irrationalist
philosophical schools, often with an obscure style, produce numerous aca-
demic publications to defend their positions, organize seminars and con-
gresses, and pass on their “knowledge” to students. It is perhaps no coin-
cidence, however, that this discursive transcendence appears at the same
time as democracy, public debate, argumentation, sophistry, rational
thinking, science, logic, theoretical mathematics and the general need for
theorization.
From the origins of philosophy, philosophers have therefore given to
the “discursive,” “logic” and “language” a semantic, ontological and episte-
mological role. To grant such powers to discursiveness, to believe that it
is possible to discuss ontological, semantic and epistemological subjects on
the basis of “discursive,” “logical” or “linguistic” considerations, is to show
transcendence. Since the real world is not made of discursive, logical or
linguistic relations, since our relation to the world is neither discursive,
neither logical, nor linguistics, a conclusion to which all elementary
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reflection arrives, it is therefore not possible to use logic or language to
deal with a single problem concerning the world or our knowledge of it.
This original sin is called panlogism (or logical imperialism) and glosso-
centrism (or linguistic imperialism) by Bunge3.
True logic is a formal science, like mathematics, distinct from the fac-
tual sciences, wrongly called empirical sciences, and the conceptual sci-
ences, i.e. metasciences4. We will return to this scientific triad in the sec-
ond part, for the moment it suffices to accept the reasonable idea that logic
and language say nothing about the world and how to know it. As we have
just indicated, a simple reflection is enough to understand that a “logical”
relationship is not to be confused with a concrete, material relationship.
The fact that transcendent philosophers insist on taking the path of dis-
cursivity, while understanding the distinction between factual relation-
ship and formal relationship, can only be the product of a transcendent
belief. They must necessarily assume that reality is not material, from
which the appearance/reality dichotomy follows.
Empiricism is often seen as the most relevant philosophical doctrine
for science. However, empiricists do not hesitate to use logicist fallacies to
make us believe that only sense data are knowable: because there are no
“logical” relationships between our sensations, perceptions, impressions
or experiences and the objects that would cause them, because an imme-
diate or direct knowledge of these objects is impossible, then, necessarily,
these objects do not exist or, if they exist, they are not knowable. The em-
piricists wanted to combat the excesses of rationalism, but on the basis of
rationalist or rationalizing reasoning. By wanting to fight Reason, they
lost their reason by raising Sensation or Perception or Experience to the
rank of supernatural faculties in the same way as Intuition, Reflection,
Creativity, Will, etc. Empiricism is transcendent. It is transcendent be-
cause it involves a principle foreign to material objects. He judges the link
between objects, in particular between objects and us, on the basis of
3 Bunge discusses an example of panlogism in Evaluating Philosophies (2012a, chap. 19), and
criticizes Chomsky’s glossocentrism in “Philosophical Problems in Linguistics” (1984).
4 A treatment for the formal/factual dichotomy is found in Chapter 8, Sections 1 and 2, and in
Chapter 10, Section 2.1 of Semantics II: Interpretation and Truth (1974b), in Chapter 5, Sec-
tion 2.2 of Epistemology I: Exploring the World (1983b), in Chapter 1, Sections 1.1 and 2.1 of
Epistemology III, part 1: Formal and Physical Sciences (1985a) and in Section 1.4 of Philosophy
of Science I: From Problem to Theory (1998a).
François Maurice | Metascience. For a Scientific General Discourse ï18
Mεtascience | No.1 | Mario Bunge: Thinker of Materiality
logical principles, or rather of philosophical-logical principles since it is no
longer a question of formal logic, which says nothing about the world.
A basic reflection makes us conclude that the world is not made up of
logical relations, that our relation to the world, of which we ourselves are
only a tiny part, does not fall within any logic, that interesting knowledge
is rarely immediate, that sensations are provoked by our interaction with
objects independent of us, objects that existed before our birth, which exist
even when we do not interact with them, that will exist after our death
and after a possible disappearance of humanity, and that knowledge of
objects involves natural sensations and mental faculties, including reflec-
tion and creativity. In short, the appearance/reality dichotomy must be
rejected, but the formal/factual dichotomy must be accepted.
Philosophy, by keeping the door open to one form or another of tran-
scendence, by favoring discursivity and postulating the existence of super-
natural faculties at the expense of the natural faculties we are endowed,
excludes itself from any modern rational debate whose canons were grad-
ually established from the Renaissance. We do not announce the death of
philosophy, we do not work on yet another re-foundation of philosophy, we
do not propose an anti-philosophy or a post-philosophy or a trans-philoso-
phy. Philosophy will not disappear since every transcending discourse
that appears on Earth seems to find a buyer at any time. There will always
be philosophers as there will always be religious and mystics of all kinds.
1.5 PHILOSOPHY IN CRISIS?
In Philosophy in Crisis, Bunge lays out ten causes, among others, to
the crisis of philosophy, and thirteen options available to philosophers who
wish to reconstruct philosophy … or perpetuate the crisis. The ten causes
of the crisis of philosophy identified by Bunge are: 1) excessive profession-
alization, 2) confusion between philosophizing and chronicling, 3) mistak-
ing obscurity for profundity, 4) obsession with language, 5) idealism, 6)
exaggerate attention to mini-problems and fashionable academic games,
7) insubstantial formalism and formless insubstantiality, 8) fragmentar-
ism and aphorisms, 9) detachment from the intellectual engines of modern
civilization, 10) ivory tower.
The choices available to philosophers who wish to reconstruct philoso-
phy or perpetuate its crisis are: 1) Authentic/fake, 2) Clear/obscure, 3)
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Critical/dogmatic, 4) Deep/shallow, 5) Enlightened/obscurantist, 6) inter-
esting/boring, 7) materialism/idealism, 8) noble/vile, 9) Open/closed, 10)
Realist/fantastic, 11) Systemic/fragmentary, 12) Topical/anachronistic,
13) Useful/useless).
Of course, the two lists overlap and the second option of each alterna-
tive from the second list constitute an additional cause for the crisis in
philosophy. The diagnosis is final and the treatment is up to the serious-
ness of the disease:
So much for a diagnosis of the ailments of contemporary philosophy. Every
one of them ought to suffice sending the dear old lady to the emergency
wing. All ten necessitate sending her to the intensive care unit. The ade-
quate treatment of the patient is obvious: A transfusion of new and tough
problems whose solution would advance knowledge; intensive exercises in
conceptual rigor resulting in the elimination of pseudophilosophical toxics;
selected morsels of mathematics, science, and technology; training in the
detection and inactivation of ideological minefields; and renewal of con-
tacts with the best philosophical tradition. (Bunge, 2004, Section 10.2)
Unfortunately, the treatment will not be effective. It is not possible to
cure the patient because she does not have any disease. Philosophy is no
sicker than religion. The state in which philosophy is found is in its natu-
ral state. Doing philosophy means supporting many of the second terms
of the alternatives presented by Bunge. For example, supporting one form
or another of idealism, rather than materialism, is essential for a philoso-
pher, just as it is essential for a religious to believe in deities. Doing phi-
losophy also means problematizing the general postulates on which sci-
ence is based. Without this questioning of the elementary and reasonable
postulates of science, philosophy no longer has its raison d’être.
The lamentable state in which philosophies find themselves is seen by
the way philosophers argue: both common sense and science are used to
defend the same thesis, and then ignore them a few paragraphs later in
the name of a less naïve and more sophisticated philosophical position,
but without explaining why common sense and science no longer do the
trick. Thus, when reading philosophers, we learn that an effective recipe
for writing a text in the analytic dialect of philosophese is to concoct a
counterfactual proposition, sprinkle it with a little of relativism, add a
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pinch of possible worlds, to brew everything with supervenience, then, fi-
nally, to cook to modal logic to give a semblance of consistency5.
The multitude of philosophical doctrines is not a sign of a crisis, but a
normal situation for any transcendent discourse. Thus, the phrase “it is
philosophy that demands it,” often presented with this emphasis in italics,
makes no sense. What philosophy? Analytic philosophy or continental phi-
losophy? Relativism? Antirealism? Or rationalism or empiricism? Who
knows! There are so many incompatible “philosophical methods” that it is
impossible to know what the expression might mean. When slipped at the
right time into an “argumentative” text, the mind is stunned and no longer
able to think, especially since the expression is used in the singular, which
gives more weight to the author’s belief. We dare not reply because philos-
ophy is a mystery and it is both admired and feared.
Equally problematic is the expression “philosophical category.” It suf-
fices to call on this expression to claim an imperium on a notion, whether
it comes from common sense, the arts and letters, or technologies and sci-
ences. The same remark is obvious. Is this an analytic category? Or a con-
tinental category? Relativist? Antirealistic? Or again, rationalist or em-
piricist? Although it is argued that the various philosophical currents,
movements and doctrines belong to the same activity known as philoso-
phy, it makes no sense to convey these expressions without any other qual-
ifier. Transcendent philosophical doctrines share a family resemblance,
but they do not share an approach and methods as is the case with the
sciences. At most, they share an attitude, a feeling that the world is more
than matter (but what exactly?), and, therefore, that the real relation be-
tween material objects are not immanent in them (therefore transcendent,
but what transcendence?), and that a particular faculty, a sixth philosoph-
ical sense, makes it possible to apprehend them (what faculty and how
does it operate?).
Similarly, the abundant literature that focuses on defending the need
for scientists to collaborate with philosophers neglects the heterogeneous
nature of philosophy, a heterogeneity that comes, as we have seen, from
the many ways that it is possible to draw the line between appearance and
reality. This heterogeneity is constitutive of philosophy: “The plurality of
5 Adapted from Maurice, “Une triade scientifique ?” (2017, p. 171).
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philosophies, their rivalry, their polemics recalled to the reason, from the
outset, that to pose is to divide and choose” (Bouveresse 2012, p. 130). The
tasks assigned to philosophy would be the clarification of scientific con-
cepts, the critical appraisal of scientific assumptions and methods, the for-
mulation of new concepts and new theories. Philosophy would be able to
do this work because it would share with science the tools of logic, concep-
tual analysis and rigorous argumentation (Laplane et al. 2019). We agree
with these authors that a certain type of discourse should in principle cor-
respond to this characterization. But why associate such a discourse with
philosophy when philosophical doctrines are plural and irreducible? Many
philosophers would not agree to define the nature of philosophy in the way
that these authors define it. What do a discourse as described by these
authors and transcendent doctrines have in common? We also agree with
these authors that several thinkers have contributed substantially to de-
bates in science, including those mentioned by way of illustration in this
article, but why associate them with philosophy, when this activity is very
heterogeneous?
Thinkers who make a contribution to science necessarily adopt a set of
general postulates similar to those attributed to science, otherwise their
contribution could not fit into a scientific debate. In other words, their ex-
changes, not only between themselves, but between them and the scien-
tists, are established within a unified framework of thought. In fact, a
plethora of philosophies do not use the tools mentioned by the authors of
this article, or if they claim to use them, it is in a very strange way, far
removed from the scientific practice. Are the logical and conceptual ana-
lyzes within the framework of possible worlds, presented in a rigorous ar-
gumentative style, of the same nature as those of sciences and metasci-
ences? Logic, conceptual analysis and rigorous argument are of no use if
the same general assumptions are not shared with science from the start.
So there is no crisis in philosophy.
We will therefore propose in the second part not the establishment of a
crisis unit to find a solution to a problem that does not exist, but rather a
research program for the development of a general discourse properly sci-
entific.
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2 SCIENTIFIC GENERAL DISCOURSE
2.1 GENERAL POSTULATES AND REFLECTION
Philosophical doctrines are normally referred to by words ending in the
suffixes -ism or -logy. Bunge also uses an impressive number of -isms to
qualify his thinking. We defend the idea that the majority of these posi-
tions are not philosophical, but the result of a reflection, and that the fact
of not problematizing them, but rather of taking them for granted, is anti-
philosophical. Thus, and paradoxically, supporting these general postu-
lates simultaneously evacuates the philosophical discourse and brings
Bunge’s way of reasoning closer to the way scientists reason. In other
words, Bunge adopts a scientific posture and not a philosophical one.
The set of general postulates supported by Bunge, combined with a
keen sense of critical thinking, coupled with an ever-active mind that
never sinks into intellectual laziness, combined with a thought that con-
tinually refuses any form of transcendence, ensures that Bunge does not
practice a form of philosophy. He invented a new way of constructing a
general discourse about the world and science. This general discourse can
be called metascience, a term already used in the past by Bunge in a sense
quite similar to our own. Bunge has managed to extract the general dis-
course from the mystical mire in which he has been bogged down for mil-
lennia. This is a revolution. A revolution for the general thought or a rev-
olution of human reflection. Bunge has built a new framework for
reflection, a framework radically different from that of philosophy, but
fundamentally in line with that of science. Nearly 2,600 years after the
first scientific and metascientific revolution, almost 500 years after the
second scientific revolution, we are witnessing the second metascientific
revolution.
What are these general assumptions taken for granted by Bunge? Here
is a non-exhaustive list of points of view that can be reached with a greater
or lesser effort of reflection:
ONTOLOGY: 1) autonomous existence of the world, 2)
uniqueness of the world, 3) materialist monism, 4) reism,
5) pluralism of properties, 6), essentialism of properties, 7)
systemism, 8) emergentism, 9) levels of reality, 10) dyna-
mism, 11) evolutionism, 12) lawfulness principle, 13) ex
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nihilo nihil fit, 14) fictionalism, 15) causal determination,
etc. EPISTEMOLOGY: 1) knowledge of the world is possible,
2) objective knowledge, 3) scientific realism, 4) moderate
skepticism, 5) moderate empiricism, 6) moderate rational-
ism, 7) fallibilism, 8) meliorism, 9) moderate pluralism of
explanations, etc. METHODOLOGY: 1) justificationism, 2)
testability, 3) confrontation of hypotheses with reality, 4)
scientism, etc. SEMANTICS: 1) creation of mental objects by
abstraction (constructs or construction of the mind), 2) dis-
tinction between a construct and a sign that designates it,
3) reference to the “external world”, etc.
It is these and several other positions, which, if supported simultane-
ously, no longer form a philosophical thought. These general assumptions
are methodologically at the foundation of science and metascience.
Let’s go back to reflection for a moment. We were saying that you don’t
have to be trained in science, philosophy and metascience to think about
some general questions. Thus, we can argue that the majority of doctrines
listed above are the result of a reflection and not the application of a phil-
osophical, metascientific or scientific method. Reflection precedes science
and metascience, and dispossesses philosophy of its status of general dis-
course par excellence. It is for this reason that factual sciences are inde-
pendent of philosophy and metascience. It is also what explains the mys-
tery of scientific progress despite the fact that the sciences are not well
founded philosophically. The best scientists are thoughtful, which allows
them to implicitly support very general hypotheses which then form a
frame of thought for their scientific research.
It is often argued that science presupposes philosophical conceptions.
In fact, what science presupposes in order to function properly consists of
very general conceptions which are arrived at by reflection and not by any
sophisticated philosophical or metascientific method. The “philosophical”
presuppositions of science, which science takes for granted, Bunge would
say, are questioned by the various transcendent philosophical doctrines
while science and metascience take them as a starting point for their re-
search. These are not philosophical, nor even scientific or metascientific
presuppositions, because there are no particular methods to conceive
them, as there are methods in science and metasciences, and also
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“methods” for the different philosophical doctrines. We are simply using
our natural ability to think at a higher level than the common thinking
we use in everyday life. As Claude Bernard remarked (1865, p. 83): “I
think there is only one way for the mind to reason, as there is only one
way for the body to walk.”
So therefore, trusting science to explain the world is not a philosophical
position. This is the result any elementary reflection achieves after exam-
ining the issue. In fact, science imposes itself on us just as the world im-
poses itself on us. Try to live for a single moment by going against the laws
of nature or try to establish a large electricity production and distribution
network without having a good deal of scientific and technical knowledge.
Despite the disinterested aspect of much of scientific research, science im-
poses itself because it works, and, if it works as well, it is because it deeply
explains the phenomena. An interesting indicator of the veracity of science
is the use made of it by large organizations which seek to take, keep or
extend their political, economic and social power. Thus, States, armies,
political parties and large corporations of all countries, in short the estab-
lishments, use science more often than mystical thinking, despite the fact
that philosophers still have doubts about the value and merits of scientific
propositions. People who run these organizations may well be great mys-
tics or great religious themselves, but like everyone else they live with
several general discourses. Even in everyday life, although the majority of
people are mystical to varying degrees, strangely, if their health, comfort
or finances are at stake, they will trust science and technology. This in-
cludes philosophers.
Bunge’s use of general presuppositions is what sets him apart from phi-
losophers who defend one form or another of scientific realism. These phi-
losophers stop where Bunge begins. They take science seriously, but only
to highlight the most general conceptions that underlie scientific activity,
which is not always easy, let’s face it. They sometimes make relevant crit-
icisms of philosophical doctrines, but they repeat the same mistakes as
philosophers. They try to find solutions, within a scientific realist frame-
work, to pseudo-problems raised by philosophers and they address sub-
jects that fall within the scope of factual sciences. Debates are increasingly
similar, within the small community of scientific realists, to the debates
of analytical philosophy: increasingly sophisticated, but less and less rel-
evant. These scientific realists may no longer be philosophers because they
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do not believe in a form of transcendence, but they have not become meta-
scientists, confining themselves to a reflection on general scientific postu-
lates. The reflections of these thinkers are interesting and shed light in
different ways on the results of reflection. Their writings can thus serve
as an introduction to what must be taken for granted to practice science
and metascience.
It should be noted in passing that it is common to associate critical
thinking with philosophy. Yet anything that is interesting in critical
thinking is not philosophy. For example, learning to identify fallacies is
not a matter of philosophy, but rather of argumentation theory. Although
the establishment of critical thinking courses was initially a departmental
strategy to attract new clients, the fact remains that those who have spe-
cialized in critical thinking are no longer true philosophers. The fact that
you are professionally a philosopher does not mean that you are intellec-
tually a philosopher.
In general, Bunge avoids philosophical pitfalls and goes beyond this
work of reflection in order to propose metascientific theories, i.e. ontology,
semantics, epistemology and a methodology of factual sciences. These the-
ories are not used to defend the general assumptions adopted by Bunge,
since these assumptions, these elementary positions, are taken for
granted by himself. Rather, Bunge’s theories are based on these elemen-
tary positions, as well as the theories of science, which means that he can
rule out many philosophical pseudo-problems and can solve many concep-
tual or metascientific problems. Whether all of the general assumptions
presented above are not exhaustive or that some of them are being debated
should not be an excuse to adopt any philosophical transcendence. Bunge’s
approach is correct.
2.2 CONTRIBUTION OF PHILOSOPHY TO METASCIENCE
Bunge was forced to assimilate much of the philosophical doctrines be-
cause before him metascience did not exist, or the little that existed was
buried under mountains of philosophical ideas. But why have philoso-
phers been able to produce some interesting results? Philosophical doc-
trines are the only ones among the transcendent general discourses to of-
fer answers to general questions which do not appeal to a notion of entities
which would enter into communication with us. This means that
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philosophers often ask relevant questions. Let us not forget, philosophy is
addressed to intellectuals who postulate principles transcendent to mat-
ter, but without being able to eliminate matter; matter is therefore asso-
ciated with appearances, in ways that differ from one doctrine to another.
Philosophers do not seek Communion, but Comprehension, which is per-
haps a form of intellectual Communion. They search beyond matter and
in spite of science, but this search takes the form of an apprehension of
Being using their own Faculties. Most mystics and religious claims to be
in communion or in communication with spiritual entities. They would not
dare to say that it is by their own means that they reach Knowledge. This
is not the attitude of a philosopher, who thinks he can attain Knowledge
through the faculties he possesses in his own right. This characteristic of
philosophy justifies talking about a metascientific revolution in ancient
Greece, although at that time, science, metascience and philosophy were
not well distinguished. Thus, as early as Antiquity, thinkers advanced in-
teresting metascientific notions. Then, in the modern era, science gradu-
ally separated from philosophy. It remained to separate metascience from
philosophy, which took a few more centuries, until the appropriate condi-
tions were put in place and a thinker of Bunge’s stature took advantage of
it. Thus, to fully understand the history of the general thought, it is nec-
essary to separate, among philosophers, their logical, mathematical, sci-
entific and metascientific contributions from their philosophical doctrines.
Philosophers often raise judicious questions, but almost always put for-
ward answers which appeal to principles foreign to matter. Philosophers,
especially transcendent philosophers, seek too far. A recovery work pa-
tiently undertaken by Bunge was then necessary. An example of recovery
is Bunge’s integration of Russell’s definite description concept into his se-
mantic theory (see Bunge 1971, 1974b, chap. 9, sect. 3). Once this recovery
work is completed, it will no longer be necessary for metascientists to refer
to philosophers except for historical reasons, that is to say for the history
of metascience. It would no longer be necessary to use any “isms” since
metasciences will then form a unified disciplinary field in the same way
as factual and formal sciences form unified disciplinary fields6. “Isms” are
6 In Emergence and Convergence, Bunge characterizes the unity of the factual sciences in the
following way: “By definition, all of the factual sciences study facts, whether actual or really pos-
sible. And all of them, even the social sciences, are expected to study them in a scientific manner,
that is, in accordance with the scientific method rather than by navel contemplation, crystal ball
gazing, trial and error, or discourse analysis. That is, beneath appearances, the sciences are
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necessary where doctrines exist, and doctrines proliferate where there are
no objects, problems and methods in common, and there can be no objects,
problems and methods in common where a thought confuses reality with
fiction.
Thus, metascience does not reject the contributions that some philoso-
phers may have made to the advancement of knowledge. It is preferable,
however, to recover these contributions under the name of a general dis-
course distinct in its approach to those of philosophical discourses. Despite
our attachment to philosophy, despite our affection for the very word phi-
losophy, it would be unreasonable to use an overloaded expression, an ex-
pression that refers to a transcendent general discourse, a discourse that
is not able to account for the world and science. In other words, the term
“philosophy” is unrecoverable. The use of another word is not only neces-
sary because the approach of metascience is different from the philosoph-
ical approach, but it will also allow minds attracted by general reflections,
really eager to know this world, which can be confused by the multitude
of philosophical systems as well as by the captivating arguments of phi-
losophers, to distinguish metascience from philosophy. One should not be
impressed by the quibbles of transcendent philosophy. We must not en-
gage in debates with analytic scholastics or with the continental cabal.
The use of the term “metascience” is therefore not innocent. It is not
simply a question of replacing one term with another, but of changing the
approach as to how to construct a general discourse about the world. In
philosophical jargon, metascience is realism and materialism, although
these “isms” no longer have their raison d’être once one refuses any form
of transcendence and one refuses to enter into a game whose rules were
established by a thought in search of transcendence and whose criteria
are foreign to science and metascience. Because of its transcendent na-
ture, philosophy cannot be a judge of science or metascience, or even col-
laborate with them.
ontologically and methodologically one: all of them study putatively real things and their changes,
in a distinctive manner that is quite different from the way theologians, literary critics, shamans,
or even craftsmen proceed.” (2003a, p. 270).
François Maurice | Metascience. For a Scientific General Discourse ï28
Mεtascience | No.1 | Mario Bunge: Thinker of Materiality
2.3 CHARACTERIZATION OF METASCIENCE
Since the beginning of the 20th century, the term “metascience” has
been used sporadically in ways quite close to each other, but without sep-
arating metascience from philosophy7. For our part, we will use it to des-
ignate both a general discourse on the world and a general discourse on
science, the two discourses complementing each other. In order to name
the metascientific disciplines, we use the names of some philosophical dis-
ciplines. Thus, we welcome within metascience semantics, ontology, epis-
temology and methodology. Note that these disciplines do not play exactly
the same role within metascience. While semantics, epistemology and
methodology study science in order to produce semantic, epistemological
and methodological theories on it, and thereby a general discourse on sci-
ence, ontology, meanwhile, aims to produce ontological theories about the
world, that is to say a general discourse in the world, based on scientific
results (Kirschenmann 1982, p. 94). Although distinct, these four disci-
plines influence each other.
The primary interest of metasciences is the development of a general
discourse on the world, an ontology, but this cannot do without a general
discourse on science since science is our main tool of knowledge. Thus, if
we wish to discuss properties in general, an ontological concept, it would
be wise to observe and then to theorize how properties are conceived by
the sciences. In other words, our conceptualization of the general concept
of property must be compatible with the way in which the most advanced
sciences conceptualize the multitude of properties with which they are
confronted. In return, this general conceptualization of properties, which
is then intended to be more precise, clearer, can be used for different
7 For a characterization of metascience by Bunge, see the first chapter of Metascientific Queries
(1959b). In addition to this work, Bunge uses the expressions “metascience” and “metascientific”
essentially in six other texts: “Laws of Physical Laws” (1961a), “The Weight of Simplicity in the
Construction and Assaying of Scientific Theories” (1961b), Method, Model and Matter (1973a),
Philosophy of Science I: From Problem to Theory (1998a), Philosophy of Science II: From Expla-
nation to Justification (1998b), Causality and Modern Science (2009a). In his autobiography, Be-
tween Two Worlds (2016, p. 102), Bunge tells us that he supported the thesis of the identification
of philosophy with metascience in “¿ Qué es la epistemología ? ”(Minerva 1, 1944, pp. 27–43), but
then realized that science supports a number of postulates and thus scientists cannot avoid phi-
losophizing. From our point of view, scientists who take the trouble to think in general terms do
not philosophize. To philosophize, you have to adopt a philosophical method, while the act of
thinking does not require any particular method. Descartes had clearly seen the difference be-
tween reflection, or reason, and method (unfortunately, his method is philosophical rather than
metascientific). This is one of the central points of our text.
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purposes. This conceptualization can lead scientists, especially those from
the least advanced or most difficult disciplines to study, to reconsider their
own notion of property, which in turn will make it possible to further re-
fine the general notion. The general discourse which is then constructed,
the metascientific vocabulary which is thus developed, can thus serve as
a common discourse for the scientists themselves, but can also be used for
teaching science and popularizing science. Note that it is not a question of
proposing a universal language for communication as it was proposed for
the ido, nor a technical language to express scientific theories, since in the
latter case mathematics already play this role. It is about building a gen-
eral representation of science, using semantic and epistemological theo-
ries, as well as a general representation of the physical, chemical, biologi-
cal, psychological and social world, using ontological theories.
The term metascience thus seems appropriate to describe these disci-
plines that analyze scientific production, such as scientific concepts, prop-
ositions and theories, in order to produce analyses and syntheses, using
metascientific concepts, propositions and theories. Metasciences are con-
ceptual sciences in that they study constructions of the mind, more pre-
cisely scientific productions, and produce constructs that are neither for-
mal nor factual, that is, constructs that do not fall within the purview of
formal sciences or factual sciences8. An important consequence of the
above is that there would be at least three concepts of truth: formal truth,
factual truth and conceptual truth9. Thus, with each scientific discourse
would correspond a concept of truth.
8 It should be noted that formal sciences also study concepts of a particular nature, that is, formal
concepts and not factual concepts, i.e. concepts produced by the factual sciences. The formal sci-
ences study formal concepts on two levels: object language and metalanguage. There is thus logic
and metalogics, and mathematics and metamathematics. The factual sciences, on the other hand,
study concrete objects, but produce concepts to do so. Since logic and mathematics already have
their own metascience or general discourse, i.e. metalogics and metamathematics, we allow our-
selves to restrict the application of the expressions metascience and conceptual sciences to factual
sciences.
9 Bunge proposes four concepts of truth in Chapter 8, section 1.3 of Semantics II: Interpretation
and Truth (1974b): logical, mathematical, factual and philosophical truth. In the case of factual
sciences, he advances the notion of partial truth. The partial truth is dealt with by Bunge on
several occasions: The Myth of Simplicity (1963, chap. 8), Semantics II: Interpretation and Truth
(1974b, chap. 8), Epistemology II: Understanding the World (1983c, appendix 3), Emergence and
Convergence (2003a, chap. 15, sect. 3), Matter and Mind (2010, chap. 15), “The Correspondence
Theory of Truth” (2012b). See also the treatment by Jean-Pierre Marquis (1990, 1991, 1992) and
in this issue, “Vérité partielle et réalisme scientifique”.
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The prefix meta- can evoke, depending on the discipline, an idea of tran-
scendence, of higher level, of a goal, an idea of cause, of change, of dis-
placement, or even of reflexive self-reference. It also expresses an idea of
posterity, change, transformation, as well as an idea of proximity and re-
semblance. We exclude the idea of transcendence as well as that of supe-
riority to characterize metascience. We prefer the idea that meta- evokes
reflection, a reflection on science, but also that it refers to the idea that
metascience is with-science.
2.4 CLASSIFICATION OF METASCIENCES
In order to continue our characterization of metasciences, we propose
a preliminary classification of these. It is experience that will ultimately
dictate the division of the metasciences, in the same way that experience
dictates the division of the sciences.
We have already mentioned four metascientific disciplines: ontology,
semantics, epistemology and methodology. In fact, we distinguish between
general ontology, semantics, epistemology and methodology, and particu-
lar ontology, semantics, epistemology and methodology, the two kinds as-
sociated with each of the four major scientific fields of physics, chemistry,
biology and psychonology10. So there are general metasciences and specific
metasciences.
At the most general level of particular metasciences, we find metaphys-
ics, metachemistry, metabiology and metapsychonology. Note that we give
a limited meaning to metaphysics: metaphysics is the metascience of phys-
ics. The metaphysician is then a physicist who conceptually studies phys-
ics in its semantic, epistemological, methodological and ontological as-
pects in order to obtain metascientific results and ideally producing
metascientific theories. These four particular metasciences, metaphysics,
metachemistry, metabiology and metapsychonology are said to be integra-
tive because they are linked to the four integrative levels of organization
of reality: the physical, the chemical, the biological and the psychonologi-
cal. Note that scientists have divided their four main disciplinary fields
10 In order to avoid using the expressions “psychology” and “metapsychology”, concepts already
loaded with multiple meanings, we formed these neologisms, psychonological and psychonology,
on the basis of psychon, to designate this level of organization that is the thinking matter and all
the disciplines that are interested in it.
François Maurice | Metascience. For a Scientific General Discourse ï31
Mεtascience | No.1 | Mario Bunge: Thinker of Materiality
according to the four levels of organization of matter11. This is no coinci-
dence since the properties studied at each level of organization cannot be
reduced to the properties of the other levels12.
We must dwell for a moment on the notion of level since the notion is
important in itself for the classification of the metasciences, but also be-
cause we present a conception of levels slightly different from that which
Bunge usually advances. Since he started thinking about the concept of
level over sixty years ago, Bunge has conceptualized levels of reality
slightly differently from one era to the next. In fact, what seems to be con-
stant in Bunge is to admit the existence of physical, chemical and biologi-
cal levels. Things get a little less clear after the biological level. Very often
Bunge postulates a social level after the biological level, sometimes this
social level is preceded by a psychological level, but this psychological level
is often a sub-level of the biological level. Sometimes a technical and se-
miotic level is added13. Bunge also maintains that each integrative level
can be analyzed in as many sub-levels as necessary, micro, meso, macro,
mega, etc.14, which we call integrated levels. For example, physics can be
subdivided into microphysics, mesophysics, macrophysics and megaphys-
ics. We believe that psychonological and social levels are part of this last
pattern.
Within the framework of the concept of metascience defended here, psy-
chonology covers the whole of disciplines grouped under the human sci-
ences, social sciences, psychology and neurosciences, in the same way as
physics, chemistry and biology embrace all disciplines that deal respec-
tively with physical, chemical or biological systems. In other words, psy-
chonology is concerned with human in what distinguishes it from the
three other levels of organization of matter. More precisely, psychonology
11 There are still debates about the nature and the number of levels. We adopt in this text a
conception of the organization of matter in four levels.
12 See Bunge (1959a) for a discussion of the imperfect correspondence between ontic and epistemic
levels.
13 For some representations of levels in Bunge, see, in particular, “Levels: A Semantical Prelimi-
nary” (1960, sect. 9), “Emergence and the Mind” (1977b, p. 504), Ontology II: A World of Systems
(1979a, p. 46), Épistémologie (1983a, chap. 7, sect. 4), Matérialisme et humanisme (2004,
sect. 3.13 et 4.3), Le matérialisme scientifique (2008, chap. 2, sect. 6), Matter and Mind (2010,
sect. 5.8), Evaluating Philosophies (2012a, sect. 18.3).
14 On the concepts of micro-, meso-, macro-level, etc., see “The Power and Limits of Reduction”
(1991, sect. 3), Finding Philosophy in Social Science (1996, chap. 10, sect. 5), Emergence and
Convergence (2003a, chap. 9, sect. 2), Matter and Mind (2010, sect. 5.8).
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is interested in thinking matter, in the same way as physics, chemistry
and biology are interested respectively in physical, chemical and living
matter. This thinking matter has systemic or emerging properties, such
as the faculties of reasoning, thinking, abstracting, socializing, setting
standards, making plans, and many others, whose physical, chemical or
biological matters are not endowed. Thinking matter is conceived as mat-
ter in its own right. We are organisms, biological beings, within which a
non-physical, non-chemical and non-living matter develops: psychonolog-
ical, mental or thinking matter. The elemental neural unit of thinking
matter is called psychon by Bunge. It is the smallest unit able to perform
a mental function (see in this regard, Bunge 1979a, chap. 4, sect. 1.2, 1980,
chap. 2, sect. 2, 1983b, chap. 1, sect. 1.1). These objects or systems are no
longer living matter. Analogy: the cell is not a chemical reactor.
Although the idea of thinking matter has been in the air for several
decades, it is not easy to accept. There is a very noble ideological reason
which exerts undue pressure to the point of preventing even some scien-
tists from exercising a critical reflection on the question: human beings
would not be apart from the animal kingdom! However, our ancestors cor-
rectly perceived the unique nature of human beings in the same way that
they correctly perceived the unique nature of life. The incorrect interpre-
tations they may have formulated of human nature (and also of the nature
of the non-living and the living), particularly in terms of superiority, illus-
trated by the notion of scala naturæ, or the Great Chain of Being, must
not be a hindrance to the acceptance of the idea of thinking matter.
Animal romanticism and the fear of making the same mistakes as our
predecessors do not mix well with critical thinking. The idea that humans
are no longer animals is not in itself a theological idea. The prowess of
“higher animals”, as wonderful as it may seem to us as lovers of nature,
has nothing in common with those of thinking matter. This amounts to
saying that the animal brain is not endowed with psychons. In other
words, the so-called superior animals do not think. The “mental” functions
that we attribute to them would be advanced biological functions. It is not
these functions that would distinguish thinking matter from biological
matter. Or these functions would be necessary for the appearance of think-
ing matter but not sufficient. Does this make humans external to nature?
No, since thinking matter is anchored in living matter, the latter is an-
chored in chemical matter, and the latter is anchored in physical matter.
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The idea of thinking matter will not instantly resolve psychonological
problems. Like any general hypothesis resulting from a reflection on the
concrete world, it should help to steer minds towards relevant questions.
We now advance the idea that the social is not an integrative level, but
rather a level integrated into the psychonological. Let us take the biologi-
cal as an analogy. Let’s also take two extremes of this level of organization,
the living cell, the basis of living matter, and an ecosystem. According to
the notion of integrated levels, we say that the study of cells is a matter of
cytology, the micro level, and the study of ecosystems is a matter of ecol-
ogy, the macro level. It is clear that it is not the ecosystems which metab-
olize but cells. However, scientists still include ecosystems in the biologi-
cal or the study of ecosystems is part of the biological sciences, with the
contribution of other disciplines if necessary. Likewise, we believe that
societies, although they do not think, should be included in the psychono-
logical, the basic unit of which is the psychon, the micro level, which
“thinks” or performs a mental function. In other words, the study of soci-
eties is part of the psychonological sciences. Thus, the social is a macro
level integrated at the integrative level which is the psychonological. We
therefore propose a representation of levels of reality as illustrated in Fig-
ure 215.
In any event, all of the above is analogy, informed, we hope. It is scien-
tific advances in neuropsychology, and an in-depth knowledge of them,
that will inform us and inform metascientific research. In the meantime,
we can think about the problem by studying the question of the reducibil-
ity of chemistry to physics and that of biology to chemistry (see
Bunge 1973a, 1979b, 1982).
To summarize the above discussion, we propose this preliminary clas-
sification of metasciences. There are four disciplines in their most general
conception: 1. general semantics, 2. general epistemology, 3. general meth-
odology, 4. general ontology. So there is a general metascience. Then there
are the same four disciplines, but associated with the four main discipli-
nary fields of physics, chemistry, biology and psychonology. So there is the
semantics, the epistemology, the methodology and the ontology of physics,
chemistry, biology and psychonology, which gives the following four
15 We have not included a technical and semiotic level, concepts advanced by Bunge, since our
reflection on the relevance of these levels is not yet finished.
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integrative metasciences: 1. metaphysics, 2. metachemistry, 3. metabiol-
ogy, 4. metapsychonology.
Figure 2: Representation of ontological levels
Disciplines are indicated for illustrative purposes.
Thus, general metasciences are fed by four specific metasciences, which
are fed by the four main disciplinary fields of the factual sciences: physics,
chemistry, biochemistry and psychonology. More specifically, if you spe-
cialize in a scientific discipline, for example sociology, which is part of psy-
chonology, we will then speak of metasociology or metascience of sociology,
an integrated and not an integrative metascience, and you will invest
yourself in research on semantics, epistemology, methodology and ontol-
ogy of sociology in order to ideally produce metasociological theories, that
is to say a general discourse on sociology (semantics, epistemology and
methodology) as well as a general discourse on the social world (ontology).
Figure 3 shows schematically the links between the factual sciences and
the conceptual sciences.
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Figure 3: Links of influence between the conceptual sciences and the factual sciences
The arrows indicate the direction of influence. For a double arrow, a larger tip indicates a
stronger influence. In order not to burden the figure, we have omitted the arrows of “vertical rela-
tions”: the particular metasciences are all linked together by reciprocal relationships two by two,
while the major disciplinary fields of factual sciences are linked together by one-sided relation-
ships that range from the physical sciences to the psychonological sciences.
The diagram is designed from the point of view of metascience. There
is no link of superiority implied by placing the metasciences on the left.
Note that the disciplines of the particular metasciences and those of the
factual sciences in Figure 3 do not have the same kinds of relationships
with each other. While there is a dependence of nature that unites the
factual sciences, this dependence is circumstantial in the case of metasci-
ences. Thus, any metascience can influence any other metascience, which
is not the case with the factual sciences. Constructs of psychonological sci-
ences have no influence on constructs of physical, chemical and biological
sciences, while some constructs of physical, chemical and biological sci-
ences have influence on psychonological sciences. Ontologically, nomic re-
lationships, i.e. laws, of a level are constrained by the nomic relationships
of the levels that precede it, which requires that statements that describe
the nomic relationships of a given level be consistent with statements that
describe the nomic relationships of the levels preceding it. On the other
hand, psychonological sciences can have an influence on the teaching of
science and on the creativity of scientists, but the constructs of the other
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three major disciplinary fields do not contain any constructs from psy-
chonological sciences.
Let us take note of the almost complete absence of the concept of
threshold in philosophy, linked to the concept of emergence. However,
threshold phenomena are well known to the factual sciences. Just think
of the phase transitions in physics. Any specialist, be it in physics, chem-
istry, biology or psychonology, can name dozens of examples of threshold
phenomena that give rise to the emergence or submergence of properties.
In other words, a critical reflection, once exposed to examples of thresholds
and to the radical transformations that physical, chemical, biological and
psychonological matter undergo at certain thresholds, leads us to conclude
that reality is organized into levels. The refusal to admit the phenomena
of threshold, emergence and qualitative leaps, as well as the notion of
level, is linked to the transcendent nature of philosophy. A transcendent
philosophical mind cannot be satisfied with a scientific explanation of
these phenomena. There would be a “philosophical” explanation, an an-
swer to a why and not only to a how, and this explanation should expose
a necessary philosophical connection, other than a necessary link inherent
in matter. However, there is no explanation for the fact that objects exhibit
a particular property. The question, “Why this property rather than an-
other?” is a particular case of the question, “Why something rather than
nothing?” And this last question is a theological question, as Bunge points
out, or more generally a transcendent question. For philosophers, science
offers no explanation because it cannot say why the world is what it is and
not something else.
Finally, the term “level” is unfortunate but it is consecrated. It leads us
to think that there is a hierarchical order. The only order that character-
izes the level structure is that of precedence, “Level 1 precedes level 2”,
i.e. a level precedes another level if and only if all objects in the second
level are composed of objects from the first level (i.e. objects that have the
characteristic properties of the first level). The expression also suggests
that reality is made up of homogeneous layers. But as Bunge points out,
levels are constructs and not concrete objects, that is, we group with the
mind all physical, chemical, biological and psychonological objects into
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distinct sets16. In fact, objects in all four levels interact and interpenetrate.
Hence the complexity of reality and the difficulty of studying it.
2.5 NON-METASCIENTIFIC DISCIPLINES
We said that any transcendent general discourse can reduce any other
discourse to its own frames of thought. Metascience, as an immanent gen-
eral discourse, does not purport to replace the general discourse of conniv-
ance or living-together, consisting of axiology, ethics and praxeology, even
if the latter can use scientific and metascientific results in the context of
their reflections. Thus, there is no metascientific axiology, ethics and
praxeology as there can be axiology, ethics and praxeology in philosophy17.
Metascience is therefore radically different from transcendent general dis-
courses since it does not attempt to find a link that would unite natural
laws with human laws. Human laws are conventions while natural laws
are representations of natural regularities that exist objectively, inde-
pendently of us. No law of nature prevents us from adopting anti-social
conventions. In fact, all societies of all times have condoned barbaric prac-
tices, and any establishments have always maintained, explicitly or im-
plicitly, a double morality, one that applies to them and another that ap-
plies to us. Metascience is therefore not concerned with the living-
together. That said, Mario Bunge’s contribution to the general discourse
of connivance is just as exceptional as his contribution to the scientific
general discourse.
Unlike transcendent philosophies, metasciences do not attempt to ad-
vance “interpretations” of formal sciences. There are already formal meta-
sciences that deal with logic and mathematics: metalogic and metamathe-
matics. Although independent of the conceptual sciences and the factual
sciences, the formal sciences play a considerable role in the development
of knowledge. The neutrality of the formal sciences, the fact that they say
16 For the notions of level and precedence, see Bunge (1979a, chap. 1, sect. 1.5).
17 Volume 8 of Bunge’s Treatise on Basic Philosophy, Ethics: The Good and the Right, is an arbi-
trary addition. There is no necessary connection between Bunge’s ethics and his metascientific
theories. The author of the Treatise was reasonable enough not to attempt to make such connec-
tions. There is a tension in Bunge’s work between his desire to know the world and make a rep-
resentation of it based on science and his desire to be part of the philosophical tradition and to be
recognized as a professional philosopher. It was this same tension that made him abandon the
use of the expressions metascience and metascientific after the 1970s in favor of the expressions
philosophy of science or foundations of science.
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nothing about the concrete world, which is the responsibility of the factual
sciences, and that they say nothing about the world in general and the
factual sciences that study the world, which is the responsibility of the
conceptual sciences, allows us to have a rigorous common language. For-
mal sciences are a subject of study for logicians and mathematicians and
a tool, an organon, for scientists and metascientists18. Note that metasci-
ence is a subject of study for metascientists and an organon for factual
science, and the latter is a subject of study for scientists and an organon
for any endeavor that requires scientific results to succeed. The scientific
triad made up of formal, factual and conceptual sciences is a subsystem of
the system of human knowledge as conceptualized by Bunge (1983c, chap.
14, sect. 3.1). It is the system of scientific knowledge. Figure 4 shows sche-
matically the links of dependence or influence within the triad.
Figure 4: Links of influence within the scientific triad
The arrows indicate the direction of influence.
For a double arrow, a larger tip indicates
a stronger influence.
18 For examples of formalization of metascientific theories see the first four volumes of the Trea-
tise on Basic Philosophy. Pay particular attention to the fact that Bunge uses general mathemat-
ics to formalize his concepts and theories. He makes extensive use of set theory, but also group
theory. These general theories can be applied in the same way that geometry, algebra and anal-
ysis can be applied. This is to say that Bunge associates metascientific semantic postulates with
his formalism, just as factual sciences associate factual semantic assumptions with their formal-
isms. In other words, Bunge’s formalism refers to extra-logical or extra-mathematical objects, the
concepts of factual science, objects that Bunge has set himself to study, in the same way that the
formalisms of factual sciences refer to extra-logical or extra-mathematical objects, objects of the
world, objects that science has given itself to study.
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Another discipline which is not a metascience, but which is of great
importance for his development, is the history of science. Bunge points out
that this is a large laboratory for the metasciences (Bunge 2003a, p. 173).
Another laboratory is the critical analysis of academic pseudosciences,
such as psychoanalysis, neoclassical economic theory, game theory, deci-
sion theory, rational choice theory, ethnomethodology, etc. The application
of metascientific concepts and theories should make it easier to identify
such pseudosciences. We also mentioned that a major task awaiting meta-
scientists for years to come is the operation of recovering philosophical
concepts with metascientific value. Such texts of critical analysis of phi-
losophy can be an opportunity to distinguish the metascientific approach
from the philosophical approach.
Contrary to a practice that seems to be spreading, we exclude from
metascience the sociology of science, the history of science, the philosophy
of science and science studies. Sociology and history of science are not
metasciences since they are factual sciences. In general, it does not occur
to us to name metaculture or metasociology of culture, the sociology of cul-
ture, or, again, to name meta-education or metapsychology of education,
the psychology of education. Being interested in culture or education does
not make a discipline a metaculture or a meta-education. So why would
being interested in science make history or sociology a metahistory or a
metasociology? History and sociology of science study concrete facts in
their historical and sociological contexts, and not the products of science
detached from these contexts. As far as transcendent doctrines in the phi-
losophy of science are concerned, they can only confuse metascientific re-
search and hinder the development of a scientific general discourse.
Be careful not to confuse history of science with history and philosophy
of science. This last discipline treats the history of science from a philo-
sophical point of view, and therefore, very often, in a transcendent way. A
true history of science is practiced by historians who use historical meth-
ods, research methods specific to this factual discipline. Finally, “science
studies” are part of a reactionary, irrationalist and anti-scientific social
movement of intellectuals within universities. “Studies” form a heteroge-
neous set of ideologies and philosophies that passes for multidisciplinarity
and interdisciplinarity. This cultural movement seeks to discredit scien-
tific disciplines and replace them with “studies”. Intolerance towards this
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movement is essential since the search for truth is denigrated within the
institutions that are tasked with advancing science (Bunge 1995).
2.6 A METASCIENTIFIC COMMUNITY
To escape the influence of transcendent philosophy is not easy if we are
too attracted to general discourse, and not enough to factual science. In
fact, even if we have a real desire to know the world and even though we
believe that science is the best way to achieve it, it remains difficult to
detach ourselves from philosophy since it is the only example of general
discourse that presents itself to us.
Unfortunately, being a scientist and immersing yourself in Bunge’s
metascientific spirit will not be enough at this stage of metascience devel-
opment. It cannot be assumed that Bunge recovered everything that
needed to be recovered or that he had properly recovered everything that
he himself had recovered. It is the nature of scientific research to con-
stantly revise its concepts and theories. Nevertheless, you will have to fa-
miliarize yourself with philosophy. If you are already a philosopher, pro-
fessional or not, you already know philosophy. If you are also a teacher or
professor-researcher in philosophy, you can desert transcendent philo-
sophical sects and become a masked metascientist within departments of
philosophy. In any case, all you have to do is become a scientist and de-
velop your metascientific mind.
If you are a scientist with a penchant for generalizations, interested in
general questions about the world and science, reading Bunge’s work will
help you develop your critical thinking and metascientific spirit, but you
will be still forced to read a good number of philosophical texts, if only to
follow Bunge’s thought, who, as the first metascientist, refers to many phi-
losophers as well as many philosophical doctrines. There is no ideal course
for a student who would like to become a metascientist. The only advice
we can offer at this point is that of reading scientific realists and Bunge’s
work while learning philosophy, but also studying a science. And that of
keeping both feet on the ground … on this Earth.
What are the safeguards for the metascientist? What can keep him
with both feet on the ground? Factual and formal sciences have equipped
themselves to prevent unbridled speculation from hindering their devel-
opment. This does not prevent pseudoscientific theories being developed
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or even that academic pseudosciences are developing in a remarkable way.
However, in general, the whole thing is kept under control within the
physical, chemical and biological sciences. It is only in the psychonological
sciences, for which there is also a lot of serious research, that literate char-
latans can still prosper. Do we have a set of criteria in metascience that
would avoid the wildest speculation? We think so. We mentioned that all
the doctrines supported by Bunge ensure that his thinking is no longer
philosophical. It is therefore enough to support a set of similar points of
view to avoid slipping too often. In other words, we take as our starting
point the general postulates mentioned before, which are taken for
granted by science and now by metascience. Without these restrictions,
the scientific general discourse will never reach sufficient unity of
thought; the plethora of philosophical doctrines is not a mark of open-
mindedness. Even if the list of general postulates will never be exhaustive,
even if certain general postulates are problematic and subject to debate,
there is no need to question the existence of reality or to believe that you
are the only spirit to exist!
Of all the general postulates necessary for metascientific research, the
most important is the reality/fiction dichotomy, which involves other di-
chotomies: factual/formal, thing/construct, property/attribute, etc. If you
fail to convince yourself that constructs of the mind do not muddle with
concrete objects, it is unlikely that you will be able to advance any meta-
scientific research. In science, even if a researcher maintains many beliefs,
he will still undertake his research according to scientific criteria. Unlike
science, metascience requires the researcher to have a clear and distinct
idea of reality and constructs. The reality/fiction dichotomy is not only a
necessary safeguard for metascientific research, but it also constitutes a
criterion of demarcation between metascience and transcendent philoso-
phy. Any idea which implies a confusion between reality and fiction, be-
tween the factual and the formal, a thing and its construct, a property and
its attribute, must be classified among the transcendent philosophical
ideas and be rejected for this reason.
Even the good faith reader might be tempted to think that it is risky to
categorically exclude some philosophical ideas. Doesn’t history show that
ideas rejected at one time were accepted in later times, both in the factual
and formal sciences? As long as a concept is factual or formal, there is a
possibility that it is right; it must pass the tests and meet the evaluation
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criteria of science. This does not apply to the strictly philosophical con-
cepts, which presuppose a form of transcendence. As soon as there is rei-
fication or ideaefication, there is transcendence19. More precisely, as soon
as an ontological, epistemological and semantic quality is attached to a
“logic”, there is reification and therefore transcendence. There will never
be anything good to draw from conceptions that postulate the existence of
fiction, as Laplace argued before Napoleon I according to an anecdote re-
ported by Victor Hugo (1972):
Mr. Arago had a favorite anecdote. When Laplace published his Celestial
Mechanics, he said, the emperor [Napoleon I] brought him in. The emperor
was furious. “How,” he cried, seeing Laplace, “makes you the whole system
of the world, you give the laws of all creation, and in all your book you do
not speak once about the existence of God!” “Sire,” replied Laplace, “I did
not need this assumption.”
We can therefore reject without further ado all transcendent philosoph-
ical concepts without fear of missing out on history or of remaining in the
annals like the one who has not been able to appreciate an idea at its true
value.
2.7 BUNGE AS THE ALTERNATIVE
From the point of view of metascience, Bunge is the last of the philoso-
phers and the first metascientist. He retains from philosophy the idea of
a complete system that would integrate semantics, ontology, epistemol-
ogy, ethics, axiology and praxeology, but he refuses to problematize in the
same way as philosophy. In particular, he rejects the appearance/reality
dichotomy, fundamental to transcendent philosophers. Since Bunge is the
first true metascientist, it is therefore wise to take his work as a starting
point. This starting point must remain what it is, a starting point. The
research program we are proposing is not free of pitfalls. The biggest trap
19 We find the following definitions in Bunge’s Philosophical Dictionary: Reification: The treat-
ment of a property, relation, process, or idea as if it were a thing. Example: “I have worries”
instead of “I am worried”; the popular notions of energy, mind, justice, and beauty as entities; the
ideas that language (rather than a speaker) is creative and grows in the mind; and the theses
that biospecies are individuals, and that lineages are historical entities. Ideaefication: The con-
strual of concrete things or processes as ideas, in the manner of Plato and Hegel. Contemporary
examples: the identification of a solid body with the set representing it; of a basket of goods with
the vector representing it; and of a social mechanism with a theoretical model of it.
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that awaits us is that of indulging in intellectual laziness and indulging
in a futile exegetical exercise. Yes, we must immerse ourselves in Bunge’s
work, just as physicists have imbued themselves with the works of Kepler,
Galileo or Newton, and yes we must assimilate the way of thinking of this
thinker, which is none other than the way that scientists think, but, no,
we must never debate what the master really said. The aim is not to de-
velop a school of thought, but rather to develop a representation of the
world in accordance with science. Bunge’s work should not be seen as a
system of thought to be preserved, but rather to be surpassed.
What is most important in this work is not the results, although it was
a feat of having produced them, but the way of thinking that led to them.
The exercise is not easy since general discourses tend to split into separate
schools of thought. One of the objectives of Mεtascience is to promote the
development of metasciences in a unified framework. In fact, the future of
metascience rests on the usefulness of metascientific results for the sci-
ences, and this usefulness has not been proved. So far, scientists have
managed to solve their problems with some implicit preconceptions while
submitting themselves to the standards, criteria and methods of science.
In any case, we must never lose sight of the fact that we want to know the
world, the natural world, the concrete world, the material world, the
worldly world. This future also depends on our ability to develop a com-
munity of researchers who agree on the objects of study of metascience, on
relevant and acceptable problems, on the methods for studying them and
on the criteria for evaluating metascientific results.
Just as the scientific approach is one, but made up of a multitude of
methods, the metascientific approach should be one, but made up of a plu-
rality of methods. We are Bungeans as we are Galileans.
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